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Abstract There is one concept in medicine which is
prominent, the symptom. The omnipresence of the symp-
tom seems, however, not to be reflected by an equally
prominent curiosity aimed at investigating this concept as a
phenomenon. In classic, traditional or conventional medi-
cal diagnostics and treatment, the lack of distinction with
respect to the symptom represents a minor problem. Faced
with enigmatic conditions and their accompanying labels
such as chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, medically
unexplained symptoms, and functional somatic syndromes,
the contestation of the symptom and its origin is immediate
and obvious and calls for further exploration. Based on a
description of the diagnostic framework encompassing
medically unexplained conditions and a brief introduction
to how such symptoms are managed both within and out-
side of the medical clinic, we argue on one hand how
unexplained conditions invite us to reconsider and re-think
the concept we call a ‘‘symptom’’ and on the other hand
how the concept ‘‘symptom’’ is no longer an adequate and
necessary fulcrum and must be enriched by socio-cultural,
phenomenological and existential dimensions. Conse-
quently, our main aim is to expand both our interpretative
horizon and the linguistic repertoire in the face of those
appearances we label medically unexplained symptoms.
Keywords Symptom  Medically unexplained
symptoms (MUS)  Basic human conditions 
Sensations
Introduction
What is a symptom? Consulting different medical ency-
clopaedias, reference works and syllabuses we find that a
symptom warns of possible disease. The appearance of the
symptom usually involves the verbal articulation of the
patient’s subjective experience of the symptom(s) and the
possible bodily manifestation that accompanies it. The
patient’s information represents the descriptive and narra-
tive background from where the clinician launches his
analytical investigation. Furthermore, and following the
presentation of the symptom, the medical investigation
aims to uncover the causes of the disease or abnormal
condition. These investigative elements, belonging to a
medical setting, serve us with a brief sketch of what takes
place in a clinical encounter. Accordingly, this is a process
wherein the symptom represents the core component of the
diagnostic process, the crux of the matter that is taken for
granted. This perspective, however, leaves us unsatisfied as
if something is missing from the picture, when entering the
empirical study of the plurality, the significance, the
diversity and the nuance and sheer volume of symptoms,
not just in health care but in everyday life. We are intrigued
by this self-confident and ‘‘homelike’’ approach which we
suggest must be extended and enriched by socio-cultural,
phenomenological and existential dimensions. Our claim is
that the acknowledgement of the symptom as a
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phenomenon has potentially far-reaching consequences for
medicine.
We do not suggest that this extended interpretation of the
symptom is particularly relevant or necessary in situations
where clinicians are confronted with a heart-attack, a
bleeding nose or a broken leg. Neither do we suggest that it is
the primary task of medicine to explore these mentioned
dimensions. Instead, we want to emphasize that the sim-
plistic medical understanding of a symptom is a ‘natural fact’
and a given unit of meaning within this discipline, but is not
restricted to being ‘at home’ in that context—neither mate-
rially nor philosophically. We find this to be especially rel-
evant and crucial in situations where medicine finds itself
challenged by ‘‘indefinable’’ or inexplicable health condi-
tions. That is, our interest in the subject of ‘‘the symptom’’
arises from our dealing with medical classifications like
‘‘subjective health complaints (SHC)’’, ‘‘medically unex-
plained symptoms MUS)’’, ‘‘complex symptoms syndrome
(CSS)’’ and ‘‘functionally somatic syndromes (FSS)’’, just to
mention a few of the terms that are often applied. The
extensive body of medical literature concerning these diag-
nostic labels confirms and demonstrates how the symptom
stands out as the centre of rotation. To be at the centre of
rotation here refers to the constitutive role symptoms have in
the construction of such diagnostic classifications.
In this paper we explore this subject along four different
dimensions. The first two should be read as a setting of the
scene, a contextualization of the studied phenomenon and
its clinical consequences: (1) What do we mean by
‘‘unexplained’’ diagnoses, and in which classificatory
framework are these embedded? (2) What dilemmas
emerge when the doctor, with such classificatory guidelines
and other remedies at hand, is faced with the symptomatic
experience of the patient? Both the diagnostic framework
and the clinical encounter are familiar contexts to a GP
dealing with such conditions. The following explanatory
step in the text aims at gradually broadening a restricted
medical-clinical concept of the symptom. By searching
‘‘prior to’’ or ‘‘beyond’’ we introductorily and briefly turn
to a third question: (3) How do we make sense of presumed
symptomatic experiences in a non-clinical context? Finally
we add rather more abstrusely and crucially: (4) What ‘‘is’’,
before it becomes a clinically perceived and interpreted
symptom?1All these questions and problems to be
addressed finally lead us towards the possibility of re-
thinking the theoretical basis and the clinical reality in
which the phenomenon of the symptom is negotiated.
The classificatory framework
Primary unexplained conditions
Approaching the multifaceted landscape of the medically
unclarified, unresolved or unexplained, we find that all the
different medical specialities have a particular grip on
‘‘their’’ unexplained conditions. For example, in the med-
ical speciality named gastroenterology we find the specific
diagnosis Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS), in physical
medicine Low Back Pain (LBP), in psychiatry General
Anxiety Disorder (GAD), in occupational medicine Mul-
tiple Chemical Sensitivity (MCS) and in rheumatology
Fibromyalgia (FM). We must furthermore add a contested
diagnosis such as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) which
appears to have a no natural given affinity to any of the
medical specialities. In different ways and with different
degrees of overlap, such conditions relate to a compre-
hensive list of symptoms such as; back pain, joint pain,
extremity pain, headache, weakness, fatigue, sleep distur-
bance, difficulty concentrating, loss of appetite, weight
change, restlessness, thoughts slow, chest pain, shortness of
breath, palpitations, dizziness, lump in throat, numbness,
nausea, loose bowels, gas/bloating, constipation and
abdominal pain (Burton 2013, p. 2)
What is common to these and other unexplained con-
ditions not mentioned here are: (a) The lack of clear aeti-
ology (the underlying cause(s) remain undetected), (b) the
possible biological mechanisms involved are unknown,
(c) the patients suffer a diversity of diffuse symptoms/signs
difficult to describe and changing over time (d) most of
them are highly contested diagnoses (they are not inter-
nationally classified), (e) they are based on subjective
patient reports (self-reported symptoms), (f) cognitive
behavioural therapy is often considered to be an effective
intervention aimed at symptom relief, (g) they altogether
affect a significant proportion of the population (although
the estimates of prevalence are highly uncertain). Let us
then turn our attention to what we tentatively describe as
‘meta-diagnoses’ (or higher-order diagnoses) which are
presumed to shed light on this medically bewildering
terrain.
‘‘Meta-diagnoses’’
Terminology and descriptive definitions have not suc-
ceeded in clarifying the classifications in terms of applied
diagnoses. Patients are given different diagnoses, depend-
ing on a variety of factors including the physicians’ clinical
speciality and scientific orientation and the popularity of a
particular diagnosis (Kanaan et al. 2007; Wolfe 2009;
Henningsen et al. 2007). Some of these are as shown in the
above section. One of the fundamental challenges of those
1 Inspired by how the German philosopher Heidegger in his book
‘‘What is called thinking’’ dealt with an inscrutable theme such as
thinking, we will try to ‘‘open up’’ that phenomenon we name
symptoms. By launching the title ‘‘What is called symptom’’ we want
this to serve as an invitation to reflection and re-thinking of this
matter.
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primary and common unexplained conditions is that they
are both specialized, fragmented and numerous. Even more
intriguing is the considerable overlap regarding the
symptomatic picture that emerges within the different
conditions. Several researchers from different sub-speci-
alities in medicine have responded to these challenges by
creating some kind of higher-order or meta-diagnosis.
Meta-diagnoses try to subsume the contested conditions we
deal with, each with its own emphasis and standpoint,
under the core dimension of what they want to designate
and a hint at a presumed aetiology. Furthermore, and even
more crucial, are these efforts aimed at creating a con-
ceptual foundation that may serve as a navigation system in
the over-complex landscape termed ‘the medically unex-
plained’. A prominent marker of such higher-order or
meta-diagnostic labels is functional somatic syndromes
(FSS). FSS ‘‘refer to a category of illnesses characterized
by particular constellations of medically unexplained
symptoms. These conditions are found in most areas of
medicine, are often chronic, and may appear similar to
known medical diseases’’ (Looper et al. 2004, p. 373).2
A second example is Bodily Distress Syndrome (BDD).
BDD was developed by Fink and colleagues from research
on symptom patterns. In general, medical definitions and
terms address symptoms as something that both presumably
invokes inner sensations and induces actions on behalf of
these sensations. One definition of such conditions has been
phrased as: ‘Conditions where the patient complains of
physical symptoms that cause excessive worry or discomfort
or lead the patient to seek treatment but for which no ade-
quate organ pathology or patho-physiological basis can be
found’ (Fink et al. 2002). A more recent definition that leaves
out care-seeking and focuses even more on the symptoms as
the dominating phenomena is ‘‘medically unexplained or
functional somatic symptoms are complaints defying the
clinical picture of known, verifiable, conventionally defined
diseases and unbacked by clinical or paraclinical findings.
They are prevalent in all medical settings and may be per-
sistent, disabling, and costly’’ (Fink et al. 2007).3
To the above-mentioned categories FSS and BDD we
could also add acronyms like central sensitivity syndrome
(CSS), subjective health complaints (SHC), somatoform
disorder (SD) and perhaps the best-known term Medically
Unexplained Symptoms (MUS). If we then return to the
underlying framework of the more common and known
diagnoses such as IBS, CFS, MCS and several others, we
are in fact confronted with a two-level acronym-complex
assumed to be an adequate response to—or in resonance
with—patient narratives or experiences concerning the
‘‘unexplained’’. This brings us to our second aim with the
presentation of primary diagnoses which concerns the
‘idiom of distress’ employed by the patient (Nichter 1981).
So far, when talking about the symptom, we have actually
submitted to a medical understanding of this and not asked
ourselves who ‘owns’ the symptom and how may it be
presented. But extracts from patients’ own stories vividly
expose the diffuseness of presenting complaints, ailments,
troubles, worries, constraints etc. that are far from delim-
iting a clear medical symptom and much closer to lived
experience and the essence of what is the matter with the
patient (Ware and Kleinman 1992, Ware 1999). Along the
way, patients may learn to speak the language of the clinic
but in many consultations the personal ‘idiom of distress’
dominates the communication about contested conditions,
often showing that different idioms may be incompatible
and belong to different contexts (Risør 2009). In the next
section we will explore the dilemma of the patient’s idiom
of distress on the one hand, and the tools at hand for
diagnosis, i.e. the classificatory frameworks, on the other,
by directing our attention to the clinical encounter.
Symptomatic experiences in the clinic
The diagnostic apparatus as discussed above has been
developed in a theoretical health-research setting, although
informed by research on empirical cases. However, the
theoretical level and the resulting diagnostic designations
are debatable and contested when applied in clinical set-
tings. Especially we will argue—with a specific focus on
the symptom construction in the doctor–patient relation-
ship—that certain dilemmas either become evident or are
precluded but still present. The dilemmas that become
obvious merge into at least five areas: (1) When people
suffer from subjective symptoms, the clinical encounter
often creates adverse effects, e.g. somatizing effects (Ring
et al. 2005) in the effort to diagnose and clarify the con-
dition. That is, somatic symptoms and syndromes are not
only limited to individual bodily sensations but are also
processed and developed in relational clinical contacts and
health encounters, e.g. by the doctors’ inclinations to pur-
sue somatic explanations and interventions (Page and
Wessely 2003) or the patient’s need for an acknowledged
diagnosis. Somatic interventions do not necessarily benefit
the patient if their somatic complaints are not justified by a
pathophysiological disorder. Several studies show that the
2 Besides IBS, other conditions subsumed under this label are food
intolerance, CFS/ME, burnout, fibromyalgia (FM), somatoform
disorder (SD), vertigo, hypochondria, whiplash and non-cardiac chest
pain (NCCP).
3 The latest results from Fink’s group showed an overlap of
symptoms and symptom patterns among a huge sample of patients
and resulted in the development of the term BDD which refers to
symptom experiences, is aetiology-neutral, leaves out behavioural
dimensions and does not reinforce a mind–body dualism (Fink and
Schrøder 2010).
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GP tends to pursue a line of somatic intervention also if he
does not have a clear idea about the aetiology of the
problem and (Salmon et al. 2005, 2008; Ring et al. 2005).
This emphasizes the tendency to a somatizing effect of
general practice and for the health professional to become
fixed upon the ‘whatness’ of the symptom. (2) Several
dimensions increase the risk of ‘dysfunctional encounters’
and iatrogenic harm, such as physicians’ attitudes to
patients presenting with medically unexplained symptoms
(Åsbring and Närvänen 2003; Page and Wessely 2003). A
core dilemma here is that of the health professionals
attributing the complaints primarily to psychopathology.
This attribution is a widespread attitude but compared with
the first mentioned dilemma, somatic interventions are still
the preferred treatment actions taken. The patients experi-
ence the attribution of psychopathology as a rejection of
the reality of symptoms (Salmon et al. 1999), since the
patient has a very physical experience of his/her symptoms
such as stomach pain, nausea or fatigue. (3) This relates to
a third topic, which illustrates the dilemma of shifting
physician strategies and approaches when managing
patients (Woivalin et al. 2004; Olde Hartman et al. 2009).
These are approaches that have consequences for treatment
and prognosis and that are based on situational and con-
textual factors in the clinic and during a consultation. It is a
challenge that only few studies deal with, that of how the
patients react to these approaches and what the patients
themselves see as important clinical issues. A study by
Salmon et al. (2005), however, shows that patients with
medically unexplained symptoms sought more emotional
support than others, but they did not ask for more expla-
nation, reassurance or somatic intervention, that is, they did
not pressurize the GP for the latter but they still received
more of it and only little emotional support. (4) A fourth
dilemma concerns how diagnostics are dependent upon
which medical speciality is consulted (Nimnuan et al.
2001). This relates to how referrals and system-initiated
patient trajectories create an excess of examinations and
hospitalizations (Henningsen et al. 2007). Somatic inter-
ventions and their dominance in clinical consultations as
already mentioned play a huge part in the process of
somatization. But the consequence of e.g. blood tests, tis-
sue tests, X-rays etc. and referrals to other specialists or
examinations is often to take the patient onto a journey of
being a ‘frequent attender’ or through a pathway of
numerous hospitalizations, solving nothing but the GP’s
need for referral. (5) The last but perhaps the greatest
dilemma concerns patients having difficulties explaining
the complexity of their complaints and being heard (Peters
et al. 2009; Kirmayer et al. 2004; Salmon et al. 2004; Risør
2010). A study by Salmon et al. (2004) illustrates this and
maintains that patients with unexplained symptoms actu-
ally express and cue psychosocial problems and
explanations at consultations but are not heard by their
GP.4 From the patients’ viewpoint, the explanations of the
illness are not always or only somatic. Several studies show
that the patients have multiple explanatory models that are
used for grasping the complexity of their conditions. Such
models cover the whole spectrum from physical, psycho-
logical, social and existential explanations, none of them
being necessarily dominant (Soderlund and Malterud 2005;
Risør 2009; Kirmayer et al. 2004). Summing up, this tells
us that the presumed centrality of physical symptoms in
medically unexplained symptoms is questionable, that is,
the emphasis on the physical aspects of symptoms. Instead
it is shown that patients think of their symptoms in complex
ways—somatically, psychologically, culturally, socially
and existentially,—and they do not even necessarily think
of their symptoms according to a medical understanding,
but in the ‘idiom’ that is closest to their own experience,
while they also integrate several explanatory models of
their conditions to try to understand what is the matter with
them. Symptoms are still fundamental to this, not only as
symptoms in themselves, but also as modalities of expla-
nations and as a result of interpretations of body, self and
illness being made before entering the clinical setting.
Beyond the clinic
What tends to be forgotten in medicine and psychiatry, is
that patients are involved in several decision processes that
precede the events and the diagnostic process that take
place in the clinical setting (Kleinman 1980). We know
very little about how bodily signs and early symptoms of
ill-health are managed in the course of everyday life out-
side the clinical setting and how this informs and influences
how people become patients and how clinical encounters
develop. That is, we have limited knowledge about the
presence of symptoms in the ‘‘popular sector’’ (ibid).
Nevertheless, several survey studies have shown that the
majority of a population experiences signs or symptoms of
which only a small part are ever presented to a health
professional. Overall, it has been estimated that up to 80 %
of all potential health problems are never presented in a
clinical setting, but are either ignored or dealt with by the
individual, the family or within the immediate social net-
work (Kleinman 1980; Janzen 2009). Furthermore, Alonzo
(1984) long ago pointed to the prevalence of symptoms that
did not reach medical care because they were either
4 A similar conclusion is reached by Olde Hartman et al. (2013),
showing that although patients had time for extensive explanations,
the GPs did not engage these in their own interpretation. This also
relates to communication problems regarding patient expectations and
incompatible explanatory models of disease (Salmon et al. 2005;
Kirmayer et al. 2004).
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‘contained’ or dismissed over time. Also it is recognized in
somatization research that symptoms that are unexplained
are experienced by everyone to a greater or lesser degree,
and what the health professionals see is only the tip of the
iceberg of normal transient changes (Merskey 2004).
In accordance with the above line of reasoning, we will
extend our examination of the world outside the clinic by
turning our attention to a phenomenological study con-
ducted by Larsson (2008). Taking as its basis an essential
concept such as lived experience, she carried out a study
conducting in-depth interviews with patients suffering from
medically unexplained physical symptoms (MUPS) (cor-
responding to MUS). One of the major themes that emerged
from this study was ‘‘pain and suffering: expressions of loss
and loneliness’’. She elaborates on this dimension as fol-
lows: ‘‘All of the study participants identified pain as a
distinctive response that communicated meaning in their
lives. For many, the pain revealed the profound nature of
personal experiences of loss and loneliness. Pain, for the
participants, expressed what words alone could not convey
about who they were as people. Pain was the embodiment of
life experiences, the manifestation of each individual’s
struggles, social isolation, and hurt’’ (p. 93). Due to this
study by Larsson, we are again reminded of the particular
idiom of distress that belongs to the world of lived experi-
ence and of how the ‘‘medical gaze’’, the tools, the pro-
fessional knowledge and medical-institutional guidance
provide a framework that has not been primarily designed to
deal with ‘‘communicated meaning’’, loss and loneliness
and pain as an embodied phenomenon.
While Larsson approached the landscape of unexplained
conditions through the concept MUPS, another study
conducted by Dickson et al. (2007) explored how people
experienced a more common or known diagnosis such as
CFS. By conducting in-depth interviews with 14 persons,
they also focused on the experience of living with a con-
dition like CFS. Besides the expected difficulties related to
the clinical encounter, the participants describe the chal-
lenges they face in carrying their fatigue-symptoms
through daily life. Some of them experience a loss of
friendships, and for this reason their stories express both
loss and regret (p. 858). The authors therefore emphasize,
in resonance with the study performed by Larsson, that
‘‘many of the participants reported feeling both isolated
and lonely as a result of CFS’’. It was even more chal-
lenging to face the mistrust of their partners. The authors
add: ‘‘This was also perceived to be a form of rejection,
and in consequence, almost all participants experienced a
loss of confidence in defending their illness to others: ‘‘If
he [my husband] doesn’t believe me and he can see how ill
I am, why would other people believe me? [Anne]’’(s.
859). This and several other studies concerning how people
experience different unexplained conditions, truly
illuminate other arenas than merely the clinical encounter
as accommodating de-legitimizing processes of ill-health.
It furthermore confirms that a wealth of life-related issues
manifest themselves when people are struck by what we
call unexplained conditions.
Beyond medicine—and health?
Let us summarize so far. Firstly, we have described some
essential components of the diagnostic structure that is
considered to be a response to the large number of existing
unexplained symptoms in the population. This diversity of
medical acronyms reflects not only a linguistic develop-
ment, but also a linguistic bewilderment. Thereby, the
ground is prepared for a potentially concealing and
obfuscating regress regarding the interpretation of such
phenomena (Eriksen et al. 2013). Secondly, we have indi-
cated how both the person with unexplained symptoms and
the doctor face major communicational and other chal-
lenges in the clinical encounter. Thirdly, we have focused
our attention on the obvious fact that symptoms necessarily
and evidently reveal themselves in people’s life-world
outside the clinic. The fundamental symptom experience is
embedded in a cultural context, affects families and rela-
tionships and will be subject to communication and
interpretation.
Based on these three aspects, we must maintain that
unexplained conditions still largely resist medical approa-
ches focusing on explanation, diagnostics and treatment,
which is shown in the above sections. Based on the
empirical research dealing with these issues, it is obvious
that the aforementioned conditions concern life-world
related phenomena which largely fall outside the ‘medical
gaze’, i.e. the medical practitioner is of course not pro-
fessionally prepared (through his training) to respond to
patients’ thinking of their symptoms in a radically different
way—existentially, culturally and socially. Trying to deal
with this challenge from an interdisciplinary standpoint, an
adequate response could be to receive and interpret such
thinking by applying philosophical/existential and socio-
cultural theories and models. This possible and presumed
alternative approach to the symptom is, however, chal-
lenging, as the concept of symptom is inevitably and
coercively applied and understood as a medical ‘property’.5
Symptoms are either threatening, i.e. possibly related to an
underlying disease, or troublesome-harmless, i.e. associ-
ated with undetected disease or non-disease. For this rea-
son we believe that the concept of symptom, to the extent
5 Although the term ‘‘symptom’’ is a part of our everyday language in
a diversity of spheres, we maintain that this wording primarily is
identified with health/disease and the branch of medicine.
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that this wording is used as an ‘‘unproblematic given’’ and
a neutral term, potentially reinforces and maintains a
process of medicalization if confronted with challenges
that turn out to be unexplained.6
In an effort to somehow transcend the concept we label
symptom we choose to enter this challenge from different
perspectives and traditions of thought. The search process
for other knowledge sources, however, includes no ambi-
tions of replacing or eliminating such a concept. This
concept is far too important, decisive and adequate when it
comes to describing and dealing with health imbalances.
Our ambitions are more modest, in that we seek to open up
a landscape whereby fundamental ideas about what is
human or a human being can be challenged, and whereby
the concept symptom is no longer a necessary fulcrum.
That is, we suggest that such an opening can support a
necessary rethinking and reinterpretation of what we con-
sider to be human nature. This does not necessarily imply
or indicate an inventing or creative process, but more
decisively a returning, remembering or recalling—of that
which is forgotten or lost sight. The first element in this
explication concerns the presumed ‘‘scene’’ or arena where
the presumed ‘‘phenomena’’ (and symptoms) are expected
to show themselves. This of course involves the concept
body, but also unfamiliar terms such as Körper and Leib.
Based on this grounding, the second step concerns a re-
introduction of what could be seen as specific ‘‘human-
like’’ appearances involving a dimension such as meaning.
In the third step we will reflect on a few possible impli-
cations following the arena-discussion, attempting to
achieve a renewed understanding (i.e. the recalling of a
possible repressed understanding) of ‘‘what is’’ or ‘‘takes
place’’ before it turns into a medical symptom. Specifically,
we will briefly touch on two exemplary appearances,
anxiety and pain. In the following sections we will give a
brief presentation of respectively socio-cultural, linguistics
and psychoanalytic approaches to this subject.
Körper and Leib
Regardless of disciplinary affiliation, we all agree on the
fact that we have a body or that we are a body. We are
bodily beings. From this baseline, it is obvious that dif-
ferent academic branches have launched quite diverse
conceptions of the ‘body’ or ‘physicality’. In our approach,
we choose to avoid the mandatory addressing of presumed
Cartesian bewilderment regarding the impossible psyche-
soma division as a starting point. We will instead turn
directly to the German expression ‘Körper und Leib’ to
shed light on the introductory elements. In a brief expli-
cation we will focus on these ideas as they have been
presented by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heideg-
ger.7According to Husserl (1973), ‘Körper and Leib’ sig-
nifies the difference between the experience of a body–
object (as we see ourselves in the mirror or the person
standing next to us) and the lived or living body as expe-
rienced (through our senses) from a first-person perspec-
tive. The former being a physical system available for
accurate description, the latter being what Baldwin (2004),
with reference to Husserl, describe as ‘‘the expression of
‘spirit’, the personal self, and also the vehicle for the
human psyche (‘soul’)’’ (p. 25). Accordingly, with the term
‘Leib’ Husserl emphasizes how consciousness is inextri-
cably connected or bound to the body (ibid). Furthermore,
Heidegger addresses these concepts in his ‘‘Zollikon sem-
inars’’ (2001). He states that the corporeal entity, ‘Körper’
(which stems from the Latin ‘corpus’), stops with the skin.
For Heidegger this conception is highly problematic and
narrow since we always find ourselves in relation to
something else. It is therefore of crucial significance when
he claims that ‘‘the bodily limit is extended beyond the
corporeal limit’’ (p. 86). He expands:
Is the body in the ‘I’ or is the ‘I’ in the body? In any
case, the body is not a thing, nor is it a corporeal
thing, but each body, that is, the body as body, is in
each case my body. The bodying forth (Leiben) of the
body, is determined by the way of my being. The
bodying forth of the body, therefore, is a way of
Dasein’s being. But what kind of being? If the body
as body is always my body, then this is my own way
of being. Thus, my bodying forth is co-determined by
my being human in the sense of the ecstatic sojourn
amidst the being in the clearing (gelichtet) (p. 87)
This bodying forth voices our relational character as human
beings. Heidegger adds: ‘‘I myself am this relationship…’’
(p. 185). For this reason we must understand bodily being
(das Leibliche) as founded upon a response to a world.
Arriving at such an understanding brings us face to face
with the essential challenges concerning ‘‘medically unex-
plained’’ conditions. Heidegger quite precisely states:
The phenomenon of the body as such is especially
concealed to physicians because they are concerned
merely with body as a corporeal thing (Leib–Körper).
They reinterpret (the body) as corporeal function. The
phenomenon of the body is wholly unique and irre-
ducible to something else, for instance, irreducible to
mechanistic systems. One must be able to accept the
phenomenon of the body as such in its intact being
(our italics). I cannot ‘understand’ something merely
6 Cf. Irving, Zola (1983).
7 Carel (2011), Leder (1990) and Csordas (1994) are examples of
similar deliberations on the body and illness which also build on those
philosophers.
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causal. That means that I can have no insight into
how one thing is derived from something else, that is,
how it originates out from it… (p. 186)
The incessant search for causal pathways concerning the
true origin of my fatigue, the related (comorbid) anxiety and
the appurtenant sadness, certainly appears, in the light of
das Leibliche in Heidegger, to be a Sisyphean task. The
body (Leib) seemingly defies our systematic and analytical
approaches. It resists, at least when we are dealing with
unexplained issues, the ‘grasping’ with the help of advanced
terminology and classificatory remedies. The giving and
expression of meaning emerge from a source that is both
‘Körperliche’ and ‘Leibliche’. Accordingly, these expres-
sions cannot be reduced to mere ‘expressions of certain
inner states’. They are more likely to be seen as linguistic
formations which emerge from our ‘living body’ and our
bodily being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the medical pro-
fessional is not only confronted a ‘mental’ or ‘psychiatric’
symptom/condition, but bodily/Leibliche appearances.
Appearances, holding—and giving meaning
These above statements do not create a harsh critique of the
efforts of medical practice, but should instead be received
as a reminder of the possible limits of the medical catch-
ment area. Once again we propose that the word ‘symptom’
designates a legitimate form of medical reasoning or way
of thinking, which one should admit is only a derivate of
more fundamental phenomena concerning life that poorly
fits the medical framework. As phenomena, they are
restored as human matters. However, frequent use of the
term human in this presentation represents an issue in
itself. To defend such a use of wording and at the same
time shed light on what are called medically unexplained
symptoms, we choose to highlight Heidegger’s response to
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) 1965 report on
psychosomatic disorders (which was one of the earlier
medical terms used to describe unexplained conditions).
The WHO here describes the individual as a complex,
dynamic system with appurtenant systemic processes. In
his ‘‘Zollikoner seminars’’ (2001), Heidegger notes the
following: ‘‘In such a conception being human is not there
at all. Everything is switched over to a system of processes,
to a state of equilibrium of such processes, determined by
the environment and by so-called inner subjectivity’’.
(p. 199). Consequently, the question ‘‘What’s the matter’’
should somehow be reframed into expressions such as
‘‘that which matters’’ or ‘‘how it matters’’. Pain, anxiety,
melancholy and fatigue is, or more accurate, matters, even
before we try to grasp—or conceptualize these phenomena
as being a collection of symptoms. They represent, and
especially when referring and relating to the so called
unexplained conditions, appearances holding—and giving
meaning. As human basic (ground) conditions, and as
phenomena, they manifest or express life itself.8 To await a
happening or an event wherein such expressions give
themselves, calls for permission for an expression to make
an impression.9 Such awaiting concern, not a waiting for,
as a waiting that awaits a certain result, but a waiting upon
where we leave open what we are waiting for (Heidegger
1966: 68). By exceeding the automated (and over-focused)
thinking concerning the expected medically (unexplained)
symptom, one gives man a chance to dwell in the dynamic
momentum wherein the voice of Leib expresses itself.
Indicative anxiety and multi-layered pain
One dimension of what we consider to be both a ‘‘körperliche’’
and ‘‘leibliche’’ appearance is Anxiety. It is furthermore con-
sidered to be an essential co-morbid symptom/condition
associated with medically unexplained conditions (Schur et al.
2007). In other words, anxiety often accompanies unexplained
health-imbalances. Exactly how it accompanies is still left as
an unanswered question. There are basically three options for
this involvement: (a) anxiety causes unexplained symptoms,
(b) anxiety accompanies such symptoms or (c) anxiety is a
consequence of unexplained health problems (e.g. persistent
musculoskeletal pain). Even though one is able both to mea-
sure (through test batteries) and launch hypotheses regarding
different causal pathways in anxiety, we argue that the fun-
damental challenge concerns understanding—not explana-
tion. Anxiety is still a condition which is poorly understood.
Accordingly, we suggest involving a contributor to a possible
‘‘pre-symptomatic’’ and ‘‘pre-disordered’’ understanding of
8 Such an interpretation evidently rests on insights from phenome-
nology. In this way, it resonates with explications from phenome-
nologists such as Robert Mugerauer (2009). In an effort to describe
the complex and inscrutable arrival of the phenomenon with the one
who is gifted (the receiver), i.e. ‘‘the way phenomena make
unpredictable landings in our lives’’ (s. 73), he continues: ‘‘Phenom-
ena arrive so discontinuously, so unexpectedly, and so much by
surprise that our contribution amounts to no more than being open to
what hits us. Often we can only await and make ourselves ready to
receive what might come, as would a good sentry at night, a first step
towards which is giving up our attempts to control, much less produce
what appears’’ (ibid).
9 This is a phrase borrowed from the Norwegian philosopher Anders
Lindseth.
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anxiety such as the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkeg-
aard.10 Through his work, first and foremost ‘‘Begrepet
angst’’ (2005) (eng; ‘‘The Concept of Anxiety’’), we were
loudly reminded that this state called anxiety is a landmark
of our humanity. Anxiety is like an adventure and ‘‘who-
ever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned
the ultimate’’ (s. 145). However, it is not the ‘‘condition’’ in
itself which represents the momentum of his reflections.
Essential for Kierkegaard is the ‘‘pointing’’ or ‘‘indicating’’
potential that anxiety holds. This ‘‘indicative’’ potential
concerns the destiny of being human, that is, related to a
‘‘process’’ of becoming—the becoming of oneself. It is
however difficult to accept that anxiety, besides arriving,
influencing, frightening and disturbing—as its undertow
drags us towards the abyss of nothingness—somehow
could be related to a possibility such as becoming. In the
midst of anxiety such a possibility is ‘‘not at hand’’ and the
most obvious response would be to escape into distraction.
Why should we then cling to remote potentialities in such a
demanding and unpleasant state? Kierkegaard answers,
‘‘indicating’’, ‘‘pointing’’, ‘‘becoming’’. Thus, anxiety
holds an invoking potential. Anxiety insists on a kind of
responsiveness and sensitivity towards ‘‘that’’ which calls
our attention (be it life processes or our finiteness). Anxiety
confronts us with questions and wonderings concerning
authenticity and inauthenticity (how we live and who we
are). Anxiety could be seen as an entry gate to our emo-
tional life. It is an ‘‘event’’ which reminds us of our free-
dom—our freedom to choose (Kierkegaard would add;
what you choose is secondary to the fact that you choose).
In harmony with such reasoning, a philosopher deeply
inspired by Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger (1996) calls
attention to the following: ‘‘That about which one has
Angst is being-in-the-world as such’’ (p. 186). Even more
decisively he states that Angst is a mood or an attunement
which discloses. It discloses the world, as world. It dis-
closes human existence. Consequently, it also reveals our
‘‘potentiality-for-being-in-the-world’’ (p. 187). Anxiety, or
angst, understood as ‘‘existential predicament’’, ‘‘human
condition’’ or ‘‘ontological characteristic’’ is related to
these dimensions of possibility. It is however a paradox
that such assumed possibilities resist what Heidegger
would describe as calculative thinking. The existence of
such possibilities cannot be proved. They can only be
experienced or lived through. As such, their existence—as
possibilities, calls for thinking and rests on faith and trust.11
Let us then turn to the phenomenon and symptom named
pain. ‘‘Living involves being exposed to pain every sec-
ond—not necessarily as an insistent reality, but always as a
possibility’’. These opening words are included in the
introductory lines of the book ‘‘A philosophy of pain’’ by
the Norwegian philosopher Vetlesen (2004). Together with
publications provided by writers and scholars such as
Lewis (2002) ‘‘The problem of pain’’, Brand and Yancey
(1993) ‘‘The gift of pain’’, Scarry (1985) ‘‘The body in
pain’’ and Wall (2000) ‘‘Pain: the science of suffering’’, he
calls our attention to an extended view of pain. Both the
manifestation of bodily and sensory pain and our exposure
to (possible future) pain represent a fundamental dimension
inextricably linked with being a living human. Although
the pain is unambiguously painful, obvious and specific
when the hammer hits your thumb, this is obviously not the
case for those conditions we refer to as unexplained. The
symptom of pain appears in an undefined, complex and
possibly indirect manner in conditions such as low back
pain (LBP) and irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). Expres-
sions such as ‘‘my back hurts’’ or ‘‘I have a stomach ache’’
represent, to the doctor, initial and fuzzy descriptions.
Accordingly, a condition like LBP is accurately referred to
as ‘‘non-specific low back pain’’ (Salathe 2012: 273). The
challenge is of course that man, in an effort to articulate
such painful conditions, is dependent on language. Con-
fronted by such a challenge, Scarry (1985) reminds us that
pain is for the most part characterized by unsharability. It
resists language. Even more intricately, she states that
‘‘Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively
destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a
state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human
being makes before language is learned’’ (p. 4). Conse-
quently, what remains as essential in the human experience
of the world of pain is pain understood as a phenomenon.
Pain is lived experience. Pain itself does not distinguish
between what is ‘‘physical’’ (somatic) and psychological
(psyche). The pain takes control of our lives. It permeates
our life-world.
Furthermore, Strang et al. (2004) with an article titled
‘‘Existential Pain, An Entity, a Provocation, or a Chal-
lenge?’’ hit the target quite accurately in terms of articu-
lating the difficulties we face. Accordingly, the vocabulary
in the foregoing paragraphs naturally appears challenging
10 The term pre-symptomatic is among other used by Kellerman
(2008). Her refers to Engel And Schmale (1967), ‘‘who point to what
they call a ‘‘giving-up/given-up’’ complex. This is a nonspecific pre-
symptomatic state. It contains a cluster of tendencies and character-
istics including: a lessening of control and a lessening of a sense of
security, helplessness and hopelessness, less certainty of one’s
perceptions of the environment and of past experience, and a
clouding of differentiation between past and future (s. 7).
11 We repeat that this explication altogether do not hold a normative
decree. It is an invitation. An invitation to reflect on the phenomenon
named anxiety. Consequently, we agree with Prasad (Prasad 2009)
which notes that: ‘‘The worry, if one takes Heidegger’s perspective, is
not that health is an outcome to be optimized by cost-effective,
evidence-based medicine, but that this might become the only way of
thinking about health—that no alternative exists’’. (p. 17).
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to the medical professional. It leads us beyond a world of
defined concepts, theoretical models, diagnostic classifi-
cations and objects for measurement. This highly com-
pacted presentation does not of course do justice to the
diverse literature on the topic of pain. However, such an
explication is defensible, given that our intention has been
to indicate how pain, as a co-constitutive element or aspect
of most medically unexplained condition, exceeds its well-
defined symptomatic character. As such, it withdraws from
scientific attempts to grasp it. It dodges attempts to explain
scientifically the possible mechanisms and causal
pathways.12
Sensations
Furthermore, we find that certain socio-cultural approaches
include ideas and perspectives that potentially supplement
and liberate us from the medical concept called symptom.
In what follows we will explicate a socio-cultural or
anthropological dimension of humanness which to a degree
is consistent with the previous preparation of the concep-
tual elements ‘Körper und Leib’. The starting point could
be a sentence like ‘I am a bundle of nerves’. This sentence
is an interpretation of maybe a whole series of different
sensations and it denotes a certain experience of illness, an
explanatory model for the concept of illness, and calls for a
study of the setting and context of the expression (Martı̀-
nez-Hernáez 2000). The understanding of symptoms is thus
closely related to cultural and biographical contexts, and
based on this presumption Martı̀nez-Hernáez takes us
through different varieties of analytical approaches within
social sciences that develop the understanding further.13
Consequently, if we focus on descriptions of symptoms, of
their definition and their whatness, they merely portray the
map of the diseases and not the landscape. The landscape
however, is experienced, lived and felt by the patients and
what is experienced are bodily sensations, not symptoms,
and embodied reactions, not criteria.14 Bodily sensations
and the importance of attending to those in studying the
experience of illness has been brought forward by several
researchers within anthropology (Hinton and Hinton 2002;
Jenkins 1991; Kirmayer 1996, 2007; Kleinman and
Kleinman 1994; Nichter and Nichter 2003) who state that
the process of interpreting and organizing sensations into
meaningful perceptions for both patient and healer are of
particular relevance to the anthropology of medicine
(Hinton et al. 2008). Examining sensations means explor-
ing what is felt by the body, how the body reacts to sen-
sations and how these are e.g. developed into specific signs
of distress or symptoms or perhaps dismissed as non-
worrying signs. Sensations in this sense are not only our
basic senses but also multimodal senses like nausea, diz-
ziness, pain, shortness of breath etc. With this approach the
starting point is not taken from what a physician classifies
as a ‘symptom’ but from the individual bodily experience
of sensations, bringing the topic back once again to who
‘owns’ the symptom and how is it conveyed.15 Conse-
quently, we argue here that such pre-symptomatic dimen-
sions should be the focus for the analysis of symptoms in
order to address the procedural and phenomenological
nature of symptom experience. The reason for this is that
symptoms require that something is known and must be
done by someone. What lies ahead, what precedes a
symptom, what ‘is’ before ‘it’ is e.g. a sensation, is
something else: ‘‘A sensation is embodied; it is felt expe-
rience. By contrast, a symptom is a constructed and
12 More than a symptom carrying unambiguous misery, we are
therefore confronted a Marcelian mystery. That is, we are confronted
with what we are unable to treat as a problem—as an object for
analytic investigation. In dealing with what is not a problem and
which pervasively concerns our existence, a reflective exploration of
such fundamental issues is not aimed at generating ‘‘solutions’’. At
best one can initiate a process whereby the present phenomenon is
received as giving pause for thought. Consequently, pain will remain
such a fundamental human condition independent of future medical
breakthroughs as regards both diagnosis and treatments (Marcel
2001).
13 Symptoms may be symbols in a Peircean sense, signs in a
Saussurian sense, dominant symbols following Good, expressions of
distress following Kleinman, ‘texts’, narratives, metaphors, met-
onyms following others etc. Ethnography and anthropology must
study the symptom as a symbol in some sense. This is notably a
positive step ahead for studies of symptoms, but turning back to the
entrapment by the notion, we argue that although symptoms are being
elaborated, contextualized and differentiated as basic anthropology or
social sciences do, the possibility of letting go of the word/notion and
stepping back to have a look at the pre-symptomatic processes of
bodily signs is lost.
14 This line of reasoning is however not restricted to a specific socio-
cultural approach. The concept of ‘‘primary’’ sensations and embod-
ied reactions also resonates with how a philosopher such as Kay
Toombs (1993), inspired by Sartre, explicates the process whereby
illness and disease is ‘‘constituted’’. She heavily relies on Sartre’s
analysis of pain and illness where he distinguishes between (1) pre-
reflective sensory experience, (2) ‘‘suffered illness’’, (3) ‘‘disease’’
and (4) the ‘‘disease state’’ (p. 230). We find that the first and second
stage is of particular interest here. At the first stage (1) according to
Toombs ‘‘one first becomes aware that all is not well in the felt
experience of some alien body sensation’’ (ibid). At the second stage
(2), ‘‘experience becomes one that must be given a meaning’’ (p.
233). Even at this second stage, she notes that ‘‘illness’’ at this point is
not constituted as a particular illness—that comes at the next level of
constitution’’(ibid).
15 Importantly, any sensation is never merely a question of physi-
ology but the meaning of sensations is culturally embedded, and
mediated by social practices and symbolic systems of meaning
(Howes 2003, 2005). Further, sensations are enacted and embodied
through relational processes and thus important to whatever takes
place concerning healing and care-seeking. As suggested by Hinton
et al (2008), sensations are key sites of embodying metaphor, of
memory making and of self-fashioning (2008).
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socially informed cognitive interpretation that indexes but
is not itself an embodied sensation’’. (Hay 2008)
Semiotic signs
The socio-cultural rudiments lead us further into a situation
where a human being find himself ‘‘thrown’’ into an
intricate web of signs in which the medical symptom holds
a prominent position. The German poet Hoelderlin even
suggest that ‘‘We are a sign that is not read…’’.16 Man is
himself a sign which forever leaves open the possibility
and process of reading. However, it is not poetry, but the
academic branch of semiotics that will follow our dealing
with this subject. Recognizing how this discipline makes
itself relevant in medical affairs have previously been
manifested by medical professionals such as Nessa (1996),
Burnum (1993) and Malterud (2000). They acknowledge,
although their professional discipline quite simply differ-
entiates between an (objective) medical sign and a (sub-
jective) symptom, that semiotic signs are of special
relevance for medicine. Consequently, signs are under-
stood, as indicated by Malterud, as ‘‘something that means
something to somebody’’ (p. 604).17 It is however neces-
sary, in addition to this acknowledgement of the semiotic
sign in a medical setting, to expand our focus. Accordingly,
we suggest that the medical conception of a sign does not
constitute an obvious fulcrum. The medical sign belongs to
a specialized, bounded and pre-defined space of profes-
sionalism. For this reason, we should turn to a basic
understanding of signs which exceeds and envelops the
medical interpretation of the same. Such a continued
analysis would include a contribution from Kugelman
(2003). In dealing with this topic, he addresses one of those
aforementioned basic phenomena constituting medically
unexplained conditions, pain. With the telling title ‘‘Pain as
Symptom, Pain as Sign’’, he emphasized how semiotics
‘‘directs inquiry to precisely those moments, events and
places within human activity where meaning is made,
communicated and enacted. This semiotic approach un-
dercuts reified dichotomies, showing instead their social
co-constitution’’ (p. 31). Furthermore, he explicates the
threefold dimensions of the sign as it both signifies, is
interpreted and point beyond itself;
For by considering the sign, we locate our studies not
at the entities that are the residues as it were of
semiotic action, but at the site where these entities,
subject and object, mind and body, sickness and
health, are constituted. Pain occurs in a complex
semiotic web, takes place structurally as a situation
and exists through the agents who embody it in a
variety of ways. Pain may be ‘my private, my
unknown’, but it is at the same time a medium within
which we share a common life.
Thus, Kugelman describes how we are integrated in a
dynamic exchange of signs.18 The dynamic aspect corre-
sponds with the etymological basis of the term symptom,
whereby this expression was related to descriptions such as
occurrence, a happening and the verb to befall. It is
therefore a potential conflict between the undisputedly
dynamic character of a sign, and the medical ambition
concerning a defining insistence—a deciphering and
‘‘retention’’ of the symptom/sign. That, which one attempts
to capture, is a sign in motion. It moves, and this moving
could be, as is often the case with regard to those
phenomena we have discussed earlier, part of a withdrawal,
into silence and ‘‘unreadability’’.
Archaic signals
Finally, we will briefly refer to how a psychoanalyst and
philosopher such as Julia Kristeva (1994) has tried to open
a landscape wherein the fixed concept symptom do not
represent the center of rotation. In a ground-breaking effort
to decipher those enigmas we name melancholy and
depression (which by the way represents cardinal co-mor-
bid aspects of the unexplained conditions), she addresses
the humor named sadness. Drawn into the kingdom of
affects, we are here faced with a kind of psychic repre-
sentation, relating to—or arising from energetic ‘‘dis-
placements’’. What is essential to our errand is how
Kristeva interprets this representation as being before signs
and before language. ‘‘The ‘‘sad’’ humor is triggered by an
energetic arousal, a tension or a conflict in a psychosomatic
organism’’ (s. 35) (our translation). She adds the following
‘‘It is reason to believe that we are here confronted with an
archaic energetic signal…’’ (ibid). Although this approach
differs from phenomenological and Heideggerian per-
spectives, the psychoanalytic conceptual framework leads
us from territorializing and absorbing conceptions of health
and disease—wherein the symptom holds a prominent role,
and back to revitalizing and thought-provoking interpreta-
tions of human life-issues.
We admit that we have so far tried to recall and restore
some basic human phenomena without providing any kind
16 This is an excerpt from his poem ‘‘Mnemosyne’’.
17 She is here referring to the Americal philospher Peirce.
18 This point is also made by Queiroz and Merrell (2006), suggesting
that ‘‘In sum, according to Peirce’s pragmatic model, semiosis, is a
triadic, dynamic, context-dependent (situated), interpreter-dependent
(dialogic), materially extended (embodied) dynamic process. It is a
social-cognitive process, not merely a static, symbolic system. It
emphasizes process rather than product, development rather than
finality. Peirce’s emphasis rests not on content, essence, or substance,
but, more properly, on dynamics inter-relations’’.
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of conceptual clarity. That is, we have not presented any
alternative and defined concepts which have the capacity to
replace or restructure the medical components which
together constitute what are called medically unexplained
symptoms (conditions). More accurately, so far we have
not been able to come up with a correspondingly alterna-
tive to the medical term symptom. We have chosen to let
the symptom, for necessary reasons, remain a medical
symptom or ‘a thing’ (which is in line with our expecta-
tions for the clinical encounter). Accordingly, our ambi-
tions have pointed in another direction. Facing a challenge
such as medically unexplained symptoms, we have tried to
address the basic human phenomena which somehow exist
relatively unaffected by advances in medicine. This has
several implications. We claim that the continuous con-
ceptual expansions in scientific medicine contribute to a
gradual loosening of its grip on and notion about the pos-
sible phenomenon it is facing. This resonates with a rec-
ognized way of thinking in science, whereby it is assumed
that the relationship between the concept and the phe-
nomenon is such that the concept constitutes the phenom-
enon. All phenomena are attacked with advanced and
highly specialized terminology wherein definitions and
conceptual structures represent a reassuring and guiding
clarification. Through this process we experience what the
French philosopher Gabriel Marcel would describe as a
successful and unfortunate transformation of a mystery into
a graspable problem. We grasp it ‘as something’ opposed
to everything else. If we can’t find the words for it, it does
not exist. The epistemic constitutes the character of reality.
The ontological is secondary to a product of and only
conditional to the epistemic–linguistic, interpreted as a
continuous collective practice. The ‘grasping’ overshadows
a possible receiving. With reference to the phenome-
non(a) called ‘‘medically unexplained conditions’’, the
phenomenon has a head start, the concept strives to catch
up; we are groping in the dark (Eriksen et al. 2013).
Archaism and romanticism?
At this late stage in our exposition we must however be
responsive to possible doubts concerning this described
returning back to the origins –to archaic moods and states.
Accordingly, a crucial question arises in the aftermath of
such reasoning; are we emphasizing a potentially reac-
tionary or archaic attitude, given the unpleasant, disturbing
and painful character of symptoms and the fact that we
have access to presumed effective and evidence-based
treatments (c.f. cognitive behavioral therapy)? We will
briefly address this question in the following. First of all,
we certainly do not dismiss developments in a branch such
as neuroscience. We welcome all those initiatives which
could provide relief for people who suffer from diverse
unexplained conditions. However, we maintain what is
crucial for our approach; a phenomenon such as anxiety is,
and will remain, despite neuroscientific progress, an
indelible part of our humanness.19 Reducing anxiety to a
neuromechanical matter locates this psychiatric disorder on
the outskirts of human being. This is true also for the
matter of pain and fatigue.
In extension of the preceding passage we choose to
continue an addressing of the term origin, in this context,
based on a possible issue such as romanticizing. That is,
romanticizing interpreted as an elevation of potentially life-
giving and health-promoting ‘‘states’’ such as fatigue,
anxiety and melancholy (related to founding terms such as
arché and ground). Assigning those mentioned ‘‘states’’
certain qualities, just as Maisel (2002) does in his book
‘‘the Van Gogh blues. The Creative Person’s Path through
depression’’, may possibly be correct. It is however not
included in our errand to promote ‘‘positive self-develop-
ment’’ as regards these matters. Our approach to this matter
is more closely in resonance with the line of reasoning
presented by a philosopher such as Alina Feld in her book
‘‘Melancholy and the otherness of God’’ (Feld 2011). We
believe that her main message is to be found in the fol-
lowing passage; ‘‘A melancholy-less world is no longer a
human world’’ (s. 194).20
Thus, we do not advocate that people should suffer
through presumed ‘‘pioneering and progressive anxiety or
melancholy’’. Neither do we consider people to be better
off if they refrain from the benefits of scientific and tech-
nological breakthroughs in medicine. Consequently, a
movement towards the ‘‘pre-disorder’’ foundations of
appearances such as anxiety, unease, melancholy, grief,
fatigue and pain holds no imperative. Instead, one should
receive this whole exposition as an invitation: an invitation
to the perhaps inviting nature of such human ontological
conditions. Furthermore, this invitation does not reside in
the competitive landscape of different interventions aimed
at solving such ‘‘disorders/illnesses’’. It is not an alternative
cure. As human ontological conditions they are inevitable,
indispensable and ineradicable.
19 A familiar line is presented by Damasio (2001) in his book
‘‘Descartes feiltakelse’’ (eng: Decartes’ error). He emphasizes that a
scientific breakthrough whereby one discover how a distinct feeling is
a product of an interacting between the brain-system and body organs,
do not reduce or weaken this feelings status as a human phenomenon.
The phenomenon named love is not devaluated due to an increased
understanding of the complex biological process that contributes to it
(p. 15).
20 In addition to this she emphasizes that ‘‘… melancholy is not
reducible to contingent socio-cultural or psychological factors but
rather is a human ontological condition par excellence….’’ (s. 192).




Symptoms constitute the diagnostic actuality we name
unexplained conditions. By the act of counting, measuring
and classifying, these seemingly scattered and incompre-
hensible appearances are assigned character as real. Fur-
thermore, by creating a complicated structure of primary
diagnosis and unifying meta-diagnosis, one creates a world
of acronyms wherein both doctors and patients can trace a
possible clarifying and confident entity. We maintain and
repeat that the creation of such a structure is the result of
anticipated action. Medical professionals and patients need
and long for such clarity. Medical researchers respond by
delivering a diagnostic web that renders possible a name-
giving. However, this does not imply that such a creative
activity is exempted from criticism. We believe these diag-
nostic endeavors indicate that medical reasoning (and
methodology) is facing a limit. Consequently, the medically
unexplained conditions represent limit-cases, but they are
handled as not-yet-resolved and obvious medical affairs. If
the medical research community in the future refrains from
reflecting thoroughly on the possible borders of medical
reason, one will continue the producing of new artifacts and
acronyms resulting in an advanced and prolonged confusion
for both patients and doctors.
We suggest that one crucial element in a possible
reflection regarding such a challenge, would be to return to
the possible origins of symptoms. The centre of rotation in
such an exploration are the following basic and self-evident
facts (a) a patient is always, before he becomes a patient, a
human being and (b) a symptom is always, before it
becomes a symptom, an event or an experience that
belongs to our humanity—our way of being-in-the-world.
Man is a cultural, existential and social being before he
becomes casuistry. He is thrown into a world of appear-
ances, sensations and signs. The medical-scientific world of
acronyms represented by CSS, PDD, BDD and MCS nec-
essarily fails to accommodate the linguistic and pre-lin-
guistic experienced world of humans. The landscape of
archaic energetic signals, bodily sensations and meaningful
experiences, is however not a landscape one should explore
searching for ultimate answers. Consequently, these ideas
represent nothing but a rich source for the birth of new
questions. As such, they should be of importance to the
medical professional or researcher. More decisive, they
could certainly be of relevance for ‘‘common people’’
struggling with their daily torments and plagues. Where
medicine, through advanced vocabulary, methodology and
technology, lose sight of our humanness and human-like
basic conditions (ontological conditions), ‘‘man’’ somehow
forget and represses the same. This is however not an
accusation. It is an invitation. To re-think and re-call that
which we currently must designate ground. We are hereby
thrown back to a possible baseline, i.e. the actual listing of
symptoms usually related to unexplained conditions.
Among these we find symptoms such as: loneliness, sad-
ness/melancholy/depression, tiredness/fatigue, anxiety/
dread/worry, diffuse or evident musculoskeletal pain, pes-
simism, lack of energy, dizziness, stomach pain, irritability,
emptiness, hopelessness, difficulty concentrating and sleep
problems/insomnia. Our goal has been to bring out how the
aforementioned list of ‘‘events’’ or ‘‘states’’ concerns basic
human conditions – or ground conditions. They give voice
to and carry our humanness. Consequently, before such
‘‘states’’ are transformed into symptoms, they are encum-
brances that follow with our vulnerability as human beings.
The medical symptom is only a derivative of such, and this
is something we tend to forget. The moods of sadness,
melancholy and tristesse appear and mark the human being,
before they are deciphered and labeled with the diagnosis
we determine as depression. Consequently, the concept
named symptom are hereby not replaced by other concepts,
but are fundamentally led back and reduced to the basis/
ground from whence humaneness arise.
Left with a possible opening and an invitation we could
certainly refrain from any dealing with the practical medical
reality—the clinic. However, we find it opportune to bring
this symptomatic journey to a close with a brief comment on
this issue. The previous chapters and paragraphs seemingly
address the doctor as he is helpless and confused facing
those mentioned unexplained challenges. Hampered by
deficient communication skills, the lack of moral attitude
and a decisive absence of adequate conceptual- or mea-
suring tools, the doctor is convicted guilty. Even though we
could seek support in empirical evidence for such claims,
this description misses the target for several reasons. Mainly
because such labels both generalizes and at the same time
disregards the struggling efforts of those GPs dealing with
such issues in their daily practices. Although some doctors
for sure faces challenges in some of these areas, we are in
doubt that the art of performing medicine—according to
which the credible and empathetic fellow human being
doctor is expected to practice, is the only place we should
look for a necessary and renewed approach to the problem
which here is named medically unexplained conditions. If
the medical professional at all represents an adressee, we
should first and foremost request these professionals to
reflect on their limitations. That is, faced with unexplained
‘‘conditions’’ and incomprehensible symptoms, the doctor’s
main mandate is to apply his extensive medical knowledge
aimed at detecting symptomatic ‘‘red flags’’ and take ini-
tiative to possible interventions aimed at reducing the
patients discomfort and pain. Although the doctor, faced
with experiences saturated with meaning and bodily sen-
sations beyond measurement, could function as a counselor
and clergyman, this is perhaps not his main obligation.
100 T. E. Eriksen, M. B. Risør
123
Author's personal copy
Where this leaves future medical professionals is a question
that calls upon further exploration.
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